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Over the last decade and a half Latin America and the Caribbean have made notable 
advances in reducing poverty and improving social outcomes. Extreme poverty fell 
by more than a third from 19.3 % in 2002 to 12.0 % in 2014;1 and inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, fell from 0.56 to 0.51.2 In parallel, child mortality 
fell from 32 to 18 deaths per 100,000 children from 2000 to 2013 (see UN IGME 
2014). By 2013, school attendance rates among 6–11-year-olds reached 98 %, and 
among 12–17-year-olds rose to 87 %.3 Although gaps remain across income and 
demographic groups, the biggest advances in reducing chronic malnutrition and 
improving school age-attendance profiles occurred for children from the lowest 
socioeconomic groups.
Many of these gains were fueled by the substantive increase in public expendi-
ture. As can be seen in Fig. 1, from 2000 to 2012 overall social spending increased 
at a much faster rate than GDP; indeed, over this period the share of social spending 
in GDP rose from 14 % to almost 19 % of GDP. Rapid increases in GDP per capita 
also directly contributed to improving social outcomes. Decompositions of the 
reduction in inequality attribute between a third and a half to the higher labor income 
of the poor associated with faster growth (Levy and Schady 2013). This report 
suggests that these two channels for improved social outcomes—rapid increases in 
1 ECLAC (2014). The poverty rate for 2014 was predicted.
2 Population-weighted calculations from IDB-harmonized household surveys for the period 
2003–2013.
3 IDB/SCL-harmonized household surveys—16 countries with data 2000–2013, weighted popula-
tion average.
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social expenditures and high rates of growth—may be less favorable in coming 
years. The increasingly constrained fiscal space faced by most countries, combined 
with a possible protracted period of lower growth, indicates that the recent pace of 
increases in social spending is unlikely to be sustainable in the coming years. While 
there is heterogeneity across countries, many are likely to face pressure to accom-
plish more with similar or lower levels of resources.
In this context, it is essential to avoid undercutting recent gains in social out-
comes. In fact, it appears that progress in reducing poverty has already stalled. 
Deploying policies to consolidate and increase social gains is of the essence. More 
precisely, the region faces two challenges: (1) ensuring that the less favorable mac-
roeconomic environment does not translate into increased inequality and poverty, 
and (2) designing social policies that help raise productivity and accelerate medium- 
term growth. Despite their best intentions, social policies that are not aligned with 
productivity will set Latin America and the Caribbean on a path to lower welfare. 
Smarter social spending needs to be a key response to the challenging scenario of 
protracted low growth—by promoting better functioning labor markets, encourag-
ing human capital accumulation, helping workers to be more effective in their jobs, 
and, ultimately, closing productivity gaps with other regions.
This chapter addresses how aspects of social policy in the areas of labor markets 
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Fig. 1 Latin American and Caribbean social spending and GDP 2000–2012. Source: ECLAC 
(2014) and IMF (2014). Population weighted for countries with spending and GDP data
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protect the important social gains achieved, and better position the region for long- 
run growth. The discussion focuses on three areas:
• Improve efficiency with a focus on quality
• Promote income stability and protection without distorting workers’ incentives
• Exercise caution with respect to creating potentially costly and irreversible 
commitments
1  Improve Efficiency with a Focus on Quality
In Latin America and the Caribbean there is ample space to improve the efficiency 
of spending and accomplish more with a similar amount of resources. In sectors 
such as health, social protection, labor training, and education, service quality 
remains the key challenge to be addressed.
1.1  Health
Health systems in the region face pressure from population aging, rising chronic 
diseases, demand to expand coverage, and adoption of technological advances. In a 
fiscally constrained scenario the priority is to adopt policies to increase technical 
and allocative efficiency without sacrificing coverage and quality. Policies should 
focus on two areas: (1) spending better, and (2) shifting more resources toward pre-
ventive services.
An analysis of 191 countries found that Latin America and the Caribbean are 
between 12 and 44 percentage points below the most efficient countries in produc-
ing healthy life expectancy—Evans et al. (2001). Marinho et al. (2012) reveal large 
discrepancies in returns on investment in the countries of the region expressed in 
indicators such as life expectancy, infant survival rate, and years of life recovered 
from communicable and noncommunicable diseases and external causes. 
Inefficiencies relate to human resources, health technology and drugs, organization 
of providers, misuse of resources, and inappropriate intervention packages.
Measures for improving efficiency include (1) closing gaps between planning 
and budget allocation by implementing strategic purchasing or value-for-money 
approaches, in which health financing decisions are based on explicit prioritization 
criteria, evidence of the cost-effectiveness of interventions, and provider quality and 
efficiency, and (2) providing incentives for productivity, quality, and innovation 
through payment mechanisms such as result-based financing.
On the other hand, implementation of preventive services—key to reducing the 
rate of growth of health spending and containing the increasing incidence of chronic 
diseases—is at an incipient stage in the region. An IDB survey of regional users that 
replicates a methodology applied in OECD countries found that only 31–52 % of 
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users of public health services in countries surveyed reported being up to date on a 
minimum set of preventive health measures, in contrast to an average of 80 % in 
OECD countries (see Fig. 2 and Guanais et al. forthcoming). In seven countries in 
the region it was estimated that 20 % of hospitalizations could be avoided with good 
primary care (Guanais et al. 2012). Strengthening the response capacity and quality 
of early care levels, as a gateway to the health system, can reduce the need for com-
plex and expensive services (OECD 2010; Smith 2012).
1.2  Social Protection: Conditional Cash Transfer Programs
Since the 1990s, when cash transfers were complemented with co-responsibility 
mechanisms to encourage human capital accumulation, conditional cash transfer 
programs (CCTs) have expanded rapidly in the region. In 2010 approximately 129 
million individuals in 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean—24 % of 
the population—were receiving transfers that represented on average 20–25 % of 
family income. CCTs have been effective in reducing the incidence and especially 
the intensity of poverty. They have also improved school attendance and reduced 
child labor, contributing to school progression (see Levy 2006; Fiszbein et al. 2009; 
Saavedra and Garcia 2012). And they have promoted the use of health services and 
reduced mortality for specific age groups (Gaarder et al. 2010; Rasella et al. 2013).
However, at least three issues need to be addressed. First, expansion of coverage 
has led to more benefits being received by the extreme nonpoor, while the coverage 
of the extreme poor is below universal. Thus, although in general CCTs have 
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Source: Guanais et al., forthcoming.  OECD is average of 11 OECD countries in Internaonal Health Policy Survey.
Fig. 2 Percentage of population up to date in preventive health measures. Source: Guanais et al. 
(forthcoming). OECD is average of 11 OECD countries in International Health Policy Survey
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program leakage and under-coverage, as shown in Fig. 3 and Stampini and Tornarolli 
(2012). To maintain their effectiveness as a tool to combat poverty, CCTs should 
prioritize targeting the poorest groups, particularly in rural areas where poverty is 
chronic.
Second, in several countries the real value of transfers, measured as a percentage 
of household income beneficiaries, has increased to 40 % of household income 
(Stampini and Tornarolli 2012; Levy and Schady 2013). Transfer levels should be 
reasonably modest in magnitude (no higher than 20–25 % of average household 
income of beneficiaries before the transfer). Increases in transfer levels should be 
carefully considered in the context of the potential for negative incentives for labor 
supply. Finally, in some countries benefits have been made contingent on the form 
of workers’ participation in the labor market, in particular on their informal status. 
This has led to incentives to remain informal, which is detrimental to workers’ own 
income and the economy’s productivity.
1.3  Training
Labor productivity is partly determined by the skills that an employee brings to the 
job and how these skills are used by the firm. Decades of poor educational policies 
have left the region with a stock of workers with relatively low skills, a major bot-
tleneck both for the adoption of new technologies and the productive use of existing 
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Fig. 3 Conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Source: Stampini 
and Tornarolli (2012)
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economic growth (Bassanini et al. 2005). Training may be particularly relevant dur-
ing economic slowdowns, when the opportunity cost is lower.
All countries in the region implement labor taxes to finance training for workers, 
ranging from 0.25 % in Uruguay to 3 % of the total payroll in Jamaica. However, in 
many cases there is little or no information on returns and accountability is lacking. 
A recent IDB study finds that on-the-job training appears to raise productivity, but 
only in the case of large firms. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of 
trained employees raises productivity by 0.8 % in firms of more than 100 employees 
(Flores Lima et al. 2014). The study also shows that the vast majority of firms self- 
finance their training rather than using public resources. Only 14–19 % of firms 
reported using public funds for training purposes in the last 3 years while 78–94 % 
reported using self-financing.4 This underscores the need to revise the coverage, tar-
geting, and relevance of the public tools that support on-the-job training in the region.
A greater impact could be achieved by investing these resources in (1) develop-
ing mechanisms to align training with the needs of companies and workers; (2) 
improving the quality of training offered; and (3) establishing systems for monitor-
ing and evaluation. An improvement in the quality of training would promote pro-
ductivity gains, and potentially reduce job loss.
1.4  Education
During the last three decades, Latin America and the Caribbean have achieved enor-
mous progress in school enrollment. Some countries in the region also saw modest 
progress in student learning. However, students from Latin America and the 
Caribbean continue to perform in the bottom quartile in the distribution of student 
test scores in most international assessments, notably the most recent Programme of 
International Student Assessment (PISA). In PISA 2012, the performance of stu-
dents in the seven countries participating from the Latin American and Caribbean 
region was among the bottom 14 out of 65 countries (Bos et al. 2014).
Poor performance in terms of quality contrasts with budgetary outlays. Spending 
on education has risen from 4.2 % of GDP in 2000 to 5.6 % in 2013 (ECLAC 2014). 
Yet there is no consistent evidence that spending on inputs such as physical infrastruc-
ture, classroom technology, flexible education funding grants, or smaller class sizes 
improves students’ learning outcomes. The effectiveness of teachers is the main lever 
to improve student learning and mounting evidence indicates that the performance of 
teachers in classrooms and the quality of teacher–student interactions determine 
learning outcomes (Hamre et al. 2014; Araujo et al. 2014). To improve the quality of 
teaching, the region may wish to consider (1) introducing selective processes to recruit 
the most talented individuals into the teaching profession, and (2) strengthening 
4 The range represents the difference between the average of small and large firms. In other words, 
14 % of small firms reported using public resources for training activities compared to 19 % of 
large firms.
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mechanisms to motivate teachers to perform at their best, including ongoing profes-
sional development and support as well as instruments to reward teacher excellence. 
These factors need not imply more spending, but rather better targeted spending.
In parallel, demographic trends in relation to students and teachers present an 
opportunity for efficiency gains. On the one hand, the overall composition of stu-
dents will continue to shift away from primary school; on the other, approximately 
one-sixth of the teaching force will reach retirement age over the next 5 years. It will 
be important to monitor population shifts to plan appropriate class sizes, and deploy 
newly recruited teachers where needed and with the right skills. Given these changes, 
opportunities exist in some countries to reallocate spending more efficiently by 
merging classes, schools, and/or school districts.
In order to identify these opportunities prospective expenditure monitoring 
requires strengthening various education data management systems (including cen-
suses of students, teachers, schools, and student learning assessments). In turn, this 
will require institutional strengthening of education offices at all levels.
2  Promote Income Stability and Protection 
Without Distorting Workers’ Incentives
There are understandable incentives, particularly during economic downturns to 
extend the coverage of social insurance, and to protect workers against income loss. 
However, some such policies may inadvertently become permanent and may be det-
rimental to long-run growth. This section discusses policy options that are compat-
ible with promoting income stability while maintaining incentives for participation 
in the formal sector to increase long-run productivity.
2.1  Improve Protection for Job Loss
In general, the region has a precarious and truncated system of protection against 
job loss that increases the costs of downturns and impedes automatic income stabi-
lization. Almost all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have mandatory 
severance pay, but only 8 provide unemployment insurance (11 if those including 
obligatory individual savings accounts are included). However, these instruments 
are only available to a select group of formal salaried workers, which constitute 
only 42 % of the workforce.5 So, for most workers, there is no preestablished unem-
ployment protection mechanism.
5 Mean for 19 countries in 2013, from IDB Labor Market and Social Security System of Indicators. 
The figure represents the proportion of formal salaried workers in relation to the total active popu-
lation (employed and unemployed workers).
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Under a severance system, the lump-sum payment paid to a dismissed formal 
worker accumulates over time, and is only due in case of unjust dismissal, provid-
ing firms with incentives to shorten job tenure below optimal levels or enter into 
litigation regarding the cause for separation. A severance pay scheme may also 
generate distortions by encouraging firms to hire permanent workers under tempo-
rary contracts, which has been shown to reduce productivity (Dolado and Stucchi 
2008). There is considerable scope to improve the coverage and design of employ-
ment protection instruments toward those that enhance long-run productivity such 
as unemployment insurance, and away from those like severance pay that can 
inadvertently hinder productivity and discourage the creation of formal 
employment.
Unemployment insurance can help families smooth income loss while provid-
ing consistent incentives for workers and firms with respect to on-the-job training 
and the retention of experienced, productive workers. A reform of severance poli-
cies would lower the labor cost associated with uncertainty arising from the high 
degree of litigiousness, which in turn would promote more formal employment of 
longer duration. The increase in formal employment contracts of indefinite dura-
tion would have the added benefit of improving the coverage of contributory pen-
sion and health programs, providing more fiscal space in the long run. In turn, 
more formality and a lower degree of temporary employment would generate pro-
ductivity gains.
For formal workers, there are advantages to moving away from a standard sever-
ance pay instrument to a mixed instrument that includes compensation, in case of 
dismissal or layoff as well as individual accounts, funded by companies (and pos-
sibly workers) that would be available to the worker in case of voluntary resigna-
tion or dismissal. The pre-savings will improve the effectiveness of the instrument, 
particularly in economic downturns.
A complementary action would be to strengthen public employment services so 
that unemployment insurance and severance pay/individual accounts can be linked 
with active policies for training and job placement. Programs can be integrated 
through “single windows,” which consolidate services and provide synergies to job 
seekers with the ultimate objective to achieve rapid and effective reintegration of 
workers.
In the event of a crisis, temporary employment programs (TEP) or public works 
are often aimed at workers without certification and/or very low skills. These can be 
effective in providing protection for income loss for informal workers, but they 
should be careful not to detract from laying the groundwork for effective systems of 
protection in the long term, that is, from promoting formality. It is also important to 
learn from past experience with TEPs: design projects that are straightforward to 
implement, minimizing administrative costs so that the bulk of the resources reach 
the workers, and set a low transfer level that incentivizes the self-targeting of labor 
supply (entry and exit of work).
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2.2  Reduce Labor Taxes to Promote Formal Sector Jobs
As reviewed in Powell (2015), raising taxes may not be the most appropriate form 
of fiscal adjustment. This is particularly true for labor taxes that tend to promote 
informality. Indeed, there is a negative relationship between the cost of labor and the 
rate of formal job creation, and while this elasticity varies from country to country, 
it is clear that higher taxes on labor can lead to a destruction of formal employment 
(Bosch et al. 2013). As described in the 2014 Latin American and Caribbean 
Macroeconomic Report, lowering labor taxes may enhance productivity and 
medium-term growth in part by reducing informality.
2.3  Promote Female Labor Force Participation
Enhancing female participation in the labor force may also enhance productivity 
as well as promote gender equality and increase income per capita. Estimates from 
the region indicate that the loss from low female participation ranges from 3.4 % 
of GDP in the case of Mexico to 17 % of GDP for Honduras (Mateo Díaz and 
Rodíguez- Chamussy 2015). Estimates for OECD countries include 5 % of GDP 
for the USA and 9 % of GDP for Japan (Elborgh-Woytek et al. 2013). Although 
Latin America and the Caribbean are the regions experiencing the highest growth 
in female labor force participation in the world (increasing from 49 % in 2000 to 
54 % in 2013), participation levels for women still lag behind those in East Asia 
and the Pacific (54 % against 63 % for 2013). Younger cohorts of women are 
achieving similar or higher levels of educational attainment than men in most 
countries of the region. Investing in quality childcare and after-school programs, 
promoting flexible job arrangements, and revising labor and social insurance leg-
islation to ensure equal treatment of women can lower barriers and, in turn, further 
promote labor insertion.
3  Exercise Caution with Respect to Creating Potentially 
Costly and Irreversible Commitments
As recognized by various authors (Duryea et al. 2009), measures considered by 
policymakers as temporary may, due to political economy reasons, become very 
difficult to change, thus creating irreversible commitments. Moreover, some such 
policies may be extremely costly, especially considering the demographic changes 
facing the region. This section discusses some selected policies that are particularly 
vulnerable in this regard.
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3.1  Minimum Wage Policies
Minimum wages continue to grow in real terms in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
generating important gains for some workers. However, minimum wages also 
generate losers: those who cannot find formal employment, or any employment, 
given the higher labor costs associated with the minimum wage. A substantial pro-
portion of the salaried workforce receives wages below the minimum in the region, 
ranging from 15 % to 17 % in Mexico and Uruguay, respectively, to 61 % and 74 % 
in Guatemala and Honduras. These figures increase as the level of the minimum 
wage increases in relation to the average wage. As such, it is important to exercise 
caution before raising the level of the minimum wage to avoid increasing unem-
ployment and reducing formal employment, both of which hurt long-term growth 
and productivity, to the detriment of workers themselves.
3.2  Adjustment Mechanisms and Levels for Noncontributory 
Pensions
Only four in ten adults aged 65 and older receive a contributory pension in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Low coverage of contributory pensions has led to a 
rapid expansion of so-called noncontributory pensions (NCPs), even though, of 
course, in the end somebody must pay. This has allowed coverage of older adults 
receiving a pension to expand. All countries have instituted some form or other of 
an NCP to address poverty in old age. Taking both together, the proportion of older 
adults who receive a pension increases from four to six out of ten, and the number 
of people receiving an NCP continues to increase rapidly in the region.
While this is positive from the point of view of poverty reduction, if appropriate 
measures are not taken, NCPs may become unsustainable from a fiscal and eco-
nomic perspective. This reflects both the weight of demographic trends and the 
incentives to refrain from contributing to pensions that NCPs can generate. In the 
next 35 years, the proportion of adults aged 65 and over will increase from 7 to 20 % 
of the total population. In light of this change in the age structure, fiscal costs of 
NCP will triple. It is therefore important to establish measures to safeguard their 
sustainability. As can be seen in Fig. 4, considerable heterogeneity currently exists 
across countries in the transfer level of NCP. While among eight countries the total 
cost of NCP is currently less than 0.5 % of GDP, in Bolivia expenditures are more 
than double that at over 1 % of GDP. If the current pension is adjusted in real terms, 
current spending on NCP will pass from approximately 1 % in Bolivia and rural 
Brazil to over 2 or 3 % of GDP by 2050 (Bosch et al. 2013). In this context, it is criti-
cal to design automatic adjustment mechanisms and strong institutions capable of 
safeguarding the amount of pensions against short-term pressures associated with 
the political process.
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In addition, if they are not designed correctly, NCPs can produce undesirable 
incentives. This is particularly the case when eligibility for an NCP is limited to 
individuals who do not have a contributory pension; this can provide a disincentive 
to participate in contributory pensions, and increase informality, which is clearly 
undesirable from the point of view of productivity. More broadly, it is important to 
integrate the noncontributory and contributory pension pillars and seek to increase 
the coverage of the contributory system. Mutatis mutandis, similar remarks can be 
made of noncontributory health insurance programs.
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Source : Bosch, Melguizo and Pagés (2013).
Fig. 4 Public spending on noncontributory pensions in 2012 (percentage of GDP). Source: Bosch 
et al. (2013)
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